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L. G. ,SPARKS CONSTRU1GTION COMPANY, for
themselves and others similarly situiated, and VILLA
MARJIA. a pa.ntnemhip.
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IN THE SUPREIVIE COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

Home Builders Association of Greater Salt
Lake, et al.
Plaintiffs and Appellants
vs
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation

Case
No.
12819

of the State of Utah.
Defendant and Respondent
Appeal from the judgment of the Fourth Judicial District for Utah County, State of Utah, the Honorable
Maurice Harding, Judge, Presiding.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
NATURE OF CASE
Plaintiffs brought this action for judgment in the
amount of sewer connection fees paid pursuant to an
ordinance plaintiffs claim to be invalid. The ordinance
requires the payment of $100 Sewer Connection Fee per
living unit.
DISBOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Plaintiffs moved the court for a Summary Judgment based on the record, depnsitions and exhibits. The
motion was denied, the -court concluding that the ordinance in question was valid.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the ordinance in question
declared invalid and to have judgment for the arnoull tR
paid defendant thereunder.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
,In December of 1967, Templeton, Linke and Alsun
1,
.
E .
Consu1tmg ngmeers, filed with Provo City a report
which reviewed the wastewater collection system, treatment plant, and proposed a master plan for collection
and treatment facilities (see report entitled Provo City,
Utah Review of Present Wastewater Collection System,
Present Wastewater Treatment Plant, Provosed Master
Plan for Wastewater Collection and Treatment Facilities.) The report noted problems including: Area~
served by 6 inch sewer mains and areas served bv
sewers of questionable construction; infiltration
ground water into the collection system; improper connection of drain systems and air conditioning systems to
the sanitary system; leaks; the production of effluent
which does not meet the requirements of the Department of Health. The report recommended ( 1) a survey
of the system, (2) corrections of fault's found. $15,000.00
to be spent each year to repair and replace, (3) a study
to set up an industrial rate schedule, ( 4) enlargement
of the treatment plant according to the master plan (Phases I through IV) to treat for a population of 150,000.
,Seeking a way to partially defray the costs of repair and replacement of the existing collection system,
treatment plant enlargement and main trunk line installation, the City relied on the report of Caldwell,
Richards and Sorenson, Inc., Engineers, of May 29 1970

;f '
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(see report entitled The Development of Sewer Service
Charqr for I'rn1'o City.) This report recommended a
c:onnrdi(1n ('li:tr~·;<· of *100 for each complete living unit.
This figur0 was arrived at by dividing the number of
c;Pwcr <·omwctions into the net value of the system. The
resulting figure of $90 was rounded off to $100.
On August 18, 1970, Provo enacted Ordinance No.
2-1-8, whiC'h ineorporated the suggestions of the Caldwell
Report (see Ordinance No. 248 entitled An Ordinance
Amending ChazJter 23.20 Sewer Connection and use).
A Portion of tlu'- Rruised Ordinances of Provo City, 1964,
as Amended, By Repealing Sections 23.20.040, Through
and I11cl11di11g Section 23.20.070 Having Reference to
Permits, Srl"l'ice Connection Fees and Assessments for
Seirer Line Installation and Connections). Under the
Ordinance, a sewer connection fee is charged at the
rate of $100 for each living unit, i.e. single family $100,
duplex $200, and fourplex $400, and a 34 unit apartment
$3400. This charge is made without regard to who paid
for the sewer line servicing the connecting property.
Prior to the enactment of the Ordinance, builders
who constructed and installed the sewer collection system to their property could connect to such system without additional charge. However, ~f the City had construefed and im;talled such system then a fee was charged
the builder to reimburse the City for such costs. This
reimbursement fee is still charged under Ordinance 248,
where the City has installed the lines.
Relating- to the land being developed, both prior
to and after the enactment of Ordinance 248 builders
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•
pay the City a water connection fee ($135 to $500) l
'ld'
.
anr
a bm mg penrnt fee; and pav for the costs of , t
.
•
va er
Imes and hookup, sewer and hookup, storm sewer svs.
tem, street construction and surfacinO'
cu1·bc·,,, gut·t·
b'
and sidewalks. (Deposition of John A. Zirbes, Proio
City Engineer, pages 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 30).
er~

The fund resulting from sewer connection fees i.'
being used and is to be used for partia1ly paying the
costs of repair and replacement of se>ver collection m.
tem, treatment plant enlargement (Phases I through
and collector trunk line installation (Deposition of Zir.
bes,, p. 10, 24, 25). The ordinance is silent ~ to purpose.

fr)

The sewer connection fund money is accounted for
together with monthly sewer service fees and Federal
grant monies under a fund called the Sewer Disposal '
Operating Fund. The ordinance has no such requirPment and this money could be in the general fund for
any City purpose. This Sewer Disposal Operating
Fund is used, in addition to the above purposes, for
payment of general operating expenses of the sewer
system including employee salaries, trucks, equipment
and bonded indebtedness, (Deposition of H. Blaine Hall,
Provo City Auditor P. 13, 16 and 18).
Provo City Ordinance 60, passed in 1953, providei
at Section 9, Paragraph (K), Page 17, for billing and
collecting "on the same bill for all water and sewrr
service supplied by the City's water system, and sewer
system." Baragraph (i) provides for the discontinu·
.ance of water service to any consumer delinquent for
more than 60 clays in the payment of sewer charges. Sec·
4

tion 10 requires connection to the sewer where the
building is \Yitltin 200 feet of a street or way in which
a pnlJlic sewer is in existence, (see Ordinance No. 60
entitled: An Ordinance Providing for the Construction
nf E.rtensio11s and hnprovements to the Municipally
011 ·ncd Scu.·rr System of Prom City, Utah, Authorizing
and Provirlin9 for the Issuance of $1,200,000 Sewer Reve1111e Bonds of Provo City, Utah, for the Purpose of Defraying Part of the Cost of the Construction of Such
Extensions and Irnprovernents; Prescribing the Form
and Other Details of Said Bonds; Providin,q for the Sale
Thereof; Pro riding for the Collection and Deposition
of the Revenues of said Utility; Making other Provisions with Respect to Operation of said Utility and the
Jssiwnce of said Bonds, and Providing for the Payment
of Said Bonds.)
The City justifies the connection fee on the basis
that the new people coming into the City create the
sewer problems and the new people should be charged
to solve the problems (Deposition of Zirbes Page 39).
ARGUMENr:DS
POINT I
1SEJWER CONNECTION FEES MAY NOT BE
(;HARGED A SEGMENT OF THE POPULATION
TO DEFRAY GENERAL GOVERNMENT EXPENSE
The sewer connection fees eharged to builders are
used in the payment of new collector trunk lines, repair
and replac-ement of existing sewer lines, enlargement
of the treatiuent plant, retirement of bonded indebtedness and general operating expenses of the sewer sys-
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tern including employees salaries, and equipment ex.
pense. These governmental functions are for the be ne.
fit of all the people of Provo nnd should be paid for by
all the people equally. The following cases hold that th~
cost of city benefits should be home by the entire corn.
munity.
Coronado Devclozm1cnt Comzwny z·s. The City 01
McPherson, Kansas, 368 P2<l 51, State statute provided
for the submission of plats to the City Planning Commission and the governing body of the City for approval
prior to filing. The statute granted the City Planning
Commission power to adopt regulations "governing the
subdivision of land, and stipulated that the regulationi
may provide for the proper area of streets in relation
to other existing or planned streets and to the mapped
plan for adequate and convenient open spaces for traffic1
utilities, access of fire-fighting apparatus, recreation1
light, and air, and for the avoidance of congestion of
population; including minimum width and area of lots. 1'
Pursuant to this statute, the City Planning Commission adopted a regulation governing subdividing
land which required the payment to the City by the
subdivider of 10% of the appraised value of platted
area for public parks or play grounds and other public

1

areas in the event there were not public open spaces
required by the governing authorities.

The Court held

that,
. . . "Under our decisions, the rule of law that
cities exist only by and through statutes
and have only such povver as the statute pre- ·
6

seribes is well established and of long standing

"

It held further that,

... "rrhe exaction of cash payments was a material
departure from the statutory authorization and
not reasonably related to the regulatory power
deh~gated to the City ... "

Of similar import is the California case of Mike
Kelber, Plaintiff and Respondent vs The City of Upland,
et al, Defe11dant and Appellant, 318 p2d 56L. This case
involves the validity of two amendments to the City's
Subdivision Control Ordinance. One provided for the
payment of $30.00 per lot fee. This fee was to be placed
in a Park and Sehool Site Fund to be used for the purpose of acquiring park and school site·s. The other
ordinance, after requiring drainage structures both inside and outsifle the subdivision, further provides that
in lieu of construction of the drainage structures outside the wbdivision, the subdivider pay $99.07 per acre
which went into a fund entitled "Subdivision Drainage Fund".
The lower court found that "the provisions of
these two ordinances ... are void and of no force and
effect; that the provisions of these ordinances are in
conflict with the provisions of the Subdivision Map
Act of this state ... "
The Court here stated that the Subdivision Map
Act pen11its the adoption of local ordinances that are
supplemental to and not in conflict with the Act, "and
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provided that they hear a rPasona:lile relation to tlw
purposes and requirements of theAct."
The Court held:

1

"All the references to local ordinanees in the
Subdivision Map Act relates to a local ordinance
as defined in the statute, and to the design and
improvement of subdivisions which are also defined in the statute ... It rather clearly appear~
that these fee provisions are fund raising methods for the purpose of helping to meet the
future needs of the entire city for park and school
sites and drainage facilities, and that they are
not reasonable requirements for the design and
improvement of the subdivision itself. It seerns
obvious that this fund raising method is not
related to the needs of this particular subdivision
or to the matter of making proper connections
between this subdivision and the adjoining area;
that it is not reasonably required by the type
and use of the subdivision as related to the char- ,
acter of local and neighborhood planning and
traffic conditions; and that it is inconsistent
with and conflicts with the provisions of the Subdivisions Map Act
1

' ... the power to require the payment of large
fees or contributions for general city benefits
as a condition of the approval of a map may not
be reasonably implied, and it is entirely inconsistent with the language and apparent intent of
the statute."
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Pioneer Trust mid 8m:ings Bank vs Village of Mount
Prospect, et rd, l/(i t-a,'2rl 799: In this case the plaintiffs
brought a mandamus proceeding to compel the corporate autlwriti('S of the Yillage of l\fount Prospect to appron' a plat of a subdivision which complied with all the
wovisions of tlH' official plan of the municipality except
that n·quiring a dedi('ation of land for public use. A
state law authorized municipalities to establish plan
e:ornrnissions with authority to recommend to the corporate authorities the adoption of the official plan. It
further provides that the plan may establish reasonable standards of design for subdivisions and for rernhdivision;; of unimproved land and of areas subject
to redevelopment including reasonable requirements for
public ;;ireets, alley \mys for public service facilities,
po.rks playgrounds, school grounds, and other public
grounds. It states further that no plat of subdivision
shall be entitled to record or shall be valid unless the
snhdivision shown thereon provides for streets, alleys
and publir grounds in conformity with the applicable
requirements of the official plan.

The Village of l\fount Prospect established a plan
commission and adopted by ordinance an official plan
as recommended by the commission. This ordinance
provides that public grounds other than streets, alleys
aud varkinµ; areas shall he dedicated in appropriate locations b~· the plat (a) at the rate of at least one acre
for each GO residential building sites or family units
\rhid1 llla>· lie accomodatecl under the restrictions applying to the larnl or (b) at the rate of at least 1/lOth acre
of each one aere of business or industrial building sites

9

which may be accomodated under the restrictions apply. •
ing to the land.
·
In the instant case, it \ms Pstahlishecl that p,,
),/
acres of the land sought to he required to be dedicated
or donated would be for the use of an elementary school
and for the use of the Mount Prospect Park District a~
an elementary school site and a secondary use as a play
ground.
·
The Court held:
... "We stated in the Rosen case that the statutory provisions with respect to reasonable requirements for street and public grounds were
based upon the theory that the developer of ~
subiivision may be required to assume those costs
which are specifically and uniquely attributable
to his activity and \vhich would otherwise be
cast upon the public. We further observe: But
because the requirement that a plat of subdivision be approved affords an appropriate point
of control with respect to costs made necessary
by the subdivision it does not follow that communities may use this point of control to solYe
all of the problems which they can foresee ...
. . . the municipality may require the developer
to provide the streets which are required by the
activity within the suhivision but cannot require
him to provide a major thoroughfare the need for
which stems from a total activity of the community ...

•

'

,

,

. . . There can he no controversy about the ohvious
fact that the orderly development of a munici- '·
10

palit.\ 111u:-;l ne<·e:-;sarily include a consideration
of the present and future need for school and
pul1lic recreation facilities ..
. . . the question presented here is one of determining- who shall pay for such improvements.
Is it reasonable that a subdivider should be require(l under the guise of the police power regulation to dedicate a portion of his property to
public use or does this amount to a veiled exercise of the vower of eminent domain and a confiscation of private property behind the defense
of police regulation!
That the addition by this subdivision of some 250
residential unit:" to the municipality would of
course aggravate the existing need for additional
school and recreational facilities is admitted by
the parties to this cause.
However this record does not establish that the
need for reereational and educational facilities
in the event that said subdivision plat is permitted to be filed is one that is specifically and
uniquel:-1 attrilmtable to the addition of the subdi\·ision and which should be cast upon the subdivirkr as his sole financial burden. The agreed
staternent of facts shows that the present school
faeilities of Mount Prospect are near capacity.
This is a result of the total development of a community. Tf this whole community had not developed to ;;neli an exten-4, or if the existing school
facilities were> greater, the purported needs sup-
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posedly would not be present. Therefore, on th!,
record of his ease, thp sehool prnhlem which
allegedly exists here is one in which the subdivider should not he ohliged to pay the total co~+,
of remedying and to so construe the statnte woulr;
amount to an exercise of the power of eminent domain without compensation.
Section G of Article II of the defendant Villaar·
Ordinance, imposes an unreasonahle condition
precedent for the approval of a plat of the subdivision and purports to take private property
for public use without compensation."
~

Fred Morrelli rs City of St. Clair Slwrcs, 96 NTJ'2,J
144, 355 Mich. 575: In this case counsel for the defendant City summarizes the nature of the local problem
and its attempted solution in the following terms in his
argument upon the ~lotion to Dismiss:
"The facts, I believe, established that St. Clair
Shores as a municipality had some 19,000 people
in 1950 and now admittedly somewhere between
50,000 and 60,000 people, so that within the fiye
years period the population has tripled. Exhibit
2 shows the charges that were made and the
items which are included in the establishin~ of
the building permit fees. Essentially, we have a
party not necessarily a resident of St. Clair
Shores applying for a building permit and as
such purchasing such special services. In other
words in applying the tripling of the population within the five year period if the residents
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of SL Clair Shores had their residences there before 1D30 or at any time prior to this rapid increase in po1rnlation, that it would be unfair and
inequitable to expect the local residents to bear
the costs of special services to be rendered to
persons applying for building permits and con::;tructing homes."
Plaintiff's counsel replied as follows:
"The situation is very simply revealed and it
cornes down to a very simple question. Does
the City of St. Clair Shores have the right to
assess a special charge against the purchaser
of a nPw home collected from him by indirectly
adding to his building co,sts for providing police
protection, fire protection and the taking care
of streets."
The Cit~· faced with fiscal problems from expansion of
its population and the demand for increased municipal
services sought a partial solution in an increase of the
fee related to building permits.
The increase in permit'S was arrived at in somewhat the following fashion:
"Those items that we considered were inapplicable to the builders fees we deleted entirely
from the costs. Those that we felt might have
something to do with overhead and burden was
home b~· the different departments because of the
building activities, we ,spread over the building
activi tie:-; on a relationship ratio of the expense
or overhead burden to the salaries involved in
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that particular department. Those department~
that had nothing to do with the building activities stood their share on a salary ratio basis
of the overhead or straight burden. We tried
to apply those expenses equitably . . . "
'Ilhe Court held:
"What is actually happened here is that the City
has sought to charge as costs incurred in administering and enforcing the building code, a substantial part of the increased expenses of City
government arising from the growth of the
City ...
. . . These are the public problems of the community and the expenses incurred in their solution are to be defrayed absent valid legislation
otherwise providing, from the general revenues
of theCity, not on a fee basis under the guise
or regulating such matters as plumbing and wiring in new houses.
The police power may not be used as a subterfuge to enact and enforce what is in reality a
revenue raising ordinance."

Weber Basin Home Builders Association, Plaintiff 4j
vs Roy City, Defendant, filed July 26, 1971: In this
case, Roy City increased its building permit fee from
$12 to $112 per unit for the purpose of obtaining money
for the general fund to improve the City's water and
sewer systems needed because of construction of new
homes. Our Supreme Court held that the increase placed
a disproportionate and unfair burden on new house-
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holds in Roy City, as compared to the old ones, in the
maintenance of the City government; and wa,s discriminatory and constitutionally impermissible.
Our Court stated:
"The critical question here is whether the ordinance in its practical operiation results in an unjust
discrimination by imposing a greater burden of
the cost of City government on one class of persons as compared to another, without any proper
basis for such differentiation and classification.
It is not to be doubted that each new residence
has its effect in increasing the costs of city government, nor that due to the steadily increasing
costs of everything, including those involved in
rendering such services, the City would have
authority to raise the fees charged for such services from time to time. Nevertheless, in that connection, the new residents are entitled to be treated equally and on the same basis as the old residents."
POINT II
THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH DO NOT
PERMIT THE CONNECTION FEE EXACTION
In its brief submitted to the trial court, the City
relied on Associated Homebuilders of the Greater East
Bay, Inc. i·s. City of Lirennore, 366 P2nd 448 and 10-8-38
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as Amended. In the Livermore ea~P, the California court construed Section 5471
of the state law authorized the City to provide by ordinance of a $150 sewer connection fee.
15

Section 54 71 provides:
"Any entity (defined to include cities by Section
5470, Subdivision ( e) shall have power, by an
ordinance apprond by a two-thirds vote of the
members of the legislative body thereof, to prescribe, revise and collect fees, tolls, rates, rentals,
or other charges for services and facilities furnished by it, either within or without its territorial limits, in connection with its sanitation or
sewerage systems; ...
Revenues derived under the prov1s10ns in this
section shall be used only for the acquisition,
construction, reconstruction, maintenance and
operation of water systems and sanitation or
sewerage facilities, to repay principal and interest on bonds issued for the construction or reconstruction of ·such water systems and sanitary
or sewerage facilities and to repay federal or
state loans or advances made to such entity for
the construction or reconstruction of water systems and sanitary sewerage facilities; provided,
however, that such revenue shall not be used
for the acquisition or construction of new local
street sewers or laterals •as distinguished from
main trunk, interceptor and outfall sewers."
The court held that such charges fall within the scope
of Section 5471 and are authorized as 'fees ... or other
charges for services and facilities furnished by (defend-

·ant city) ... "
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10-8-38 Utah Code Annotated 1953, as Amended,
provides:

"Boards of co1111nissi.oners, city councils and
boards of trustees of cities and towns may construct, reconstruct, maintain and operate, sewer
systems, sevmge treatment plants, culverts, drains,
sewers, eatch basins, manholes, cesspool s iand all
systems, equipment and facilities necessary to the
property drainage, sewage and sanitary sewage
disposal requirements of the city or town and
regulate the construction 1and use thereof.
1

Any city or town may, for the purpose of defraying the cost of construction, reconstruction, miaintenance ·or operation of any sewer system or
sewage treatment plant, provide for mandatory
hookup where the sewer is available and within
300 feet of any property line with any building
used for human ·occupancy and make a reasonable charge for the use thereof. In order to enforce the mandatory hookup to the sewer where
available and the collection of any such charge,
any city or town operating a waterworks system
may make one charge for the combined use of
water and the services of the sewer system, including the services of any sewage treatment
plant operated by the city or town and may provide by ordinance that application for service
from such combined system shall be made in writing, signed by the owner desiring such service
or his authorized agent, in which application
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such owner shall agr<>e that he will pay for all
service furnished such owner according to the
rules and regulations enacted in the ordinance
of such city or town.
In case an application for furnishing service
from such combined systems shall be made by a
tenant of the owner, such city or town may require as a condition of granting the same that
such application contain an agreement signed by
the owner or his duly authorized agent to the
effect that in consideration of granting such
application the owner will pay for all service
furnished such tenant or any other occupant of
the premises named in the application in case
such tenant or occupant shall fail to pay for the
same according to the ordinance of such city
or town.
In case any person shall fail to hook up to the
sewer where available and in case any applicant
shall fail to pay for the service furnished according to the rules and regulations prescribed
by the ordinances of such city or town, then the
city or town may cause the water to be shut off
from such premises and shall not be required to
turn the same on again until such person has hooked up to the sewer at his own expense or all arrears for service furnished shall be paid in full.
Cities and towns may sell and deliver from the
surplus capacity thereof services of any such
system or facility not required by the munici-
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pality or its inhabitants to others beyond the
limit of the municipality."
The California statute provides for "fees, tolls, rates,
rentals or other charges for services and facilities furnished by it . . . m connection with its sanitation or
sewerage systems . . . "
The Utah statute provides for "mandatory hookup
... an<l ... reasonable charge for the use thereof. In
order to enforce the mandatory hookup ... and the collection of any such charge ... (the City) may make one
eharge for the combined use of water and the services
of the sewer system ... "
It goes on to provide for shutting off the water
where there is a delinquency.

Provo has such an arrangement providing for mandatory hookup, one charge for combined water and
sewer, :and shut off in case of delinquency.
It is submitted the Utah statute in authorizing a
reasonable charge for use does not authorize an additional fee for sewer connection to be paid by new residents.

The power to impose a sewer connection tax cannot
be inf erred from 10-8-30.
In the case ·of Sanchez vs City of Santra Fe, 481 p2d
401: A state ena:bling statute authorized an ordinance
regarding subdivision regulations to provide for the
harmonius development of the municipality and its environs; adequate open spaces for traffic, recreation,
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drainage, light and air ... and other matters necessary
to carry out the purpose6 of the municipal code.
PursUJant thereto, the City passed an ordinance requiring the payment of $50 per lot by the subdivider as
a condition to approval of the plat. The sums thus collected were to be placed in a separate special "Public
Faeilities Purchase Fund" and used only for the purchase or improvements of public facility sites or parts
thereof ... intended to serve the area being subdivided.
The Court held the ordinance unlawful and in violation of State and Federal Constitutions.
The Court stated:
"Cities exist only by virtue of statutory creation
and have only such power statutes expressly confer without resort to implieation ... Having decided that the ordinances in question are not geared for regulation so as to make it a police power,
it follows that such a fee requirement is in the
nature of a tax. The power to tax is never inferred."
The cases cited under Point I apply here also.
CONCLUSION
Provo City has been and now is charging a monthly
sewer ,service fee to all users of its sanitary sewer system. This is the reasonable charge for the use of such
system contemplated by 10-8-38. It further follows the
statute by requiring mandatory hookup, one eombined
billing f.or water and sewer and water shut off in case

20

of delim1uency. The statute does not authorize an additional fee to be paid.
Land developel"s vay all the costs and expenses of
extending water and sewer mains, installations to the
structure, curbs, gutters and sidewalks, in addition to
building permit fees and $135 to $500 water connection
fee. After hook up with the system, a monthly sewer
service fee is paid. It is not proper to charge an additional fee to some users to pay for general community
expenses of all of new collector trunk lines, repair and
replacement of existing sewer lines, enlargement of
treatment plant, retirement of bonded indebtedness and
general operation of the sewer syistem.
It is respectfully submitted Ordinance 248 should

be held invalid and plaintiffs should be awarded judgments for amounts paid thereunder.
LA VAR E. STARK
Attorney for Appellants
2651 Washington Blv.
Suite No. 10
Ogden, Utah 84401
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